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I examine the impact of racial identity on behaviour in trust games played
by White, Black and Coloured high school students in South Africa. There
is a systematic pattern of distrust towards Black partners, even by Black
proposers, partially attributable to mistaken expectations. White proposers
are signiﬁcantly less likely to engage in a strategic interaction at all when
paired with a Black partner, while Coloured and Black proposers engage in
exchange but at lower levels than when paired with non-Blacks. However,
greater racial diversity in schools and friendship groups is positively and
signiﬁcantly associated with greater trust towards Black partners.
1 Introduction
With the demise of apartheid in South Africa came increased awareness and
visibility of the social disparities between the diﬀerent race groups, and a strong
emphasis in policy initiativeson levelingthe playing ﬁeld, and bringing previously
marginalised individuals, particularly Black South Africans and women, into the
economic mainstream. Yet, despite some progress towards racial reconciliation,
large socio-economic inequalities between race groups remain, and race continues
∗Many thanks to Sam Bowles, Michael Ash, Gene Fisher, Malcolm Keswell, Catherine Eckel,
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1to be a pervasive theme in everyday life. To the extent that the expectations
and social meanings created by apartheid persist, one might expect the racial
identity of participants to aﬀect trust relationships, particularly those involving
Black South Africans, as it was this group that was most severely marginalised
by apartheid institutions.
Yet, these eﬀects have been little studied in South Africa. In an important
study, one of the ﬁrst of its kind in South Africa,1 Ashraf et al [2003] ﬁnd that
Black proposers make signiﬁcantly lower oﬀers in a trust game, supporting previ-
ous work suggesting that members of previously disadvantaged groups in a society
may be less trusting [Alesina et al, 2000]. The work reported here comes from
trust games run with high school students in which photographs of participants
were used to transmit information about the race of the individuals in the games,
and extends this earlier work by examining the impact of the racial identity of
both the proposer and the trustee on individual behaviour in this strategic set-
ting. Thus, the work described here more closely resembles that of Fershtman
and Gneezy [2001, 2002], Glaeser et al [2000], and Eckel and Wilson [2003].
2 Trust and Social Identity
Individuals may diﬀer in their trust levels because of diﬀering beliefs about the
trustworthiness of others or diﬀerent abilities to elicit trustworthy behaviour from
others [Glaeser et al, 2000]. These diﬀerences may be exacerbated in segmented
societies where group aﬃliation based on some individual attribute such as race,
ethnicity, or gender, is particularly salient, with trust being inversely related to
the social distance between groups [Zak and Knack, 2001; Bouckaert and Dhaene,
forthcoming; Akerlof, 1997]. Thus, while inter- and intra-group trust may aﬀect
the economic success or failure of the society as a whole [Knack and Keefer,1997],
it may also aﬀect the relative economic outcomes for diﬀerent groups within that
society [Fershtman, and Gneezy, 2001]. Individuals may be less likely to trust
outsiders, and more prone to stereotyping, especially where outsiders can be eas-
ily identiﬁed by costlessly observable cues such as race and gender2[Chandra,
2003; Cornell, 1996]. In return, negative group stereotypes may aﬀect the perfor-
mance of members of those groups about whom the stereotype exists [Hoﬀ and
1The only other trust game study in South Africa that the author is aware of is the work of
Carter and Castillo [2003] and in this work, they do not examine diﬀerences in behaviour by
race.
2Because these attributes are costlessly observable, they are likely to be privileged over other
categorisations, such as class or educational background, even when the latter might be more
relevant for individuals trying to distinguish between in-group and out-group members.
2Pandey, 2003; Steele et al, 2002]. Hoﬀ and Pandey [2003] provide evidence from
experiments in India that caste identity, when it is publicly revealed, inhibits the
motivation of low-caste subjects in maze-solving experiments, and attribute this
lowered motivation to an expectation on the part of low caste subjects that their
eﬀorts would be poorly rewarded.
Mounting experimental evidence suggests that real attributes such as race
[Glaeser et al, 2000; Eckel and Wilson, 2003], gender [Scharleman et al, 2001;
Chaudhuri et al, 2002; Croson and Buchan, 1999] and ethnicity [Fershtman and
Gneezy, 2001; Brouckaert and Dhaene, 2003] do aﬀect behaviour in the trust
game. In their work on the impact of linguistic segmentation in Belgium, and
religious segmentation in Israel, Fershtman et al[2002] ﬁnd evidence of insider
favouritism, with individuals tending to favor players from his/her own linguis-
tic or religious group. In their work on ethnic aﬃliation in Israel [Fershtman
and Gneezy, 2001], they ﬁnd that signiﬁcantly lower oﬀers are made to Jews
of Eastern origin, particularly men. Most surprising about this pattern of dis-
trust towards Eastern Jewish males is that it is perpetuated by Eastern Jewish
males themselves. By way of contrast, in a more recent study which also re-
lied on names to reveal ethnic identity, Bouckaert and Dhaene [forthcoming] do
not ﬁnd any evidence of discrimination in the levels of trust or reciprocity in a
trust game in which male small business owners of Turkish and Belgian ethnic
backgrounds were matched with each other. They attribute this to the fact that
the small business owners shared other common characteristics (namely, gender,
socio-professional status and place of residence) suﬃcient to reduce the salience
of ethnic diﬀerences.
Instead of relying on names to signal ethnic identities, other studies have made
use of photographs to transmit information about the race of players [Eckel and
Wilson, 2003] or have allowed participants to see each other face to face before the
experiment begins [Glaeser et al, 2000]. Glaeser et al [2000] ﬁnd that proposers
in same race pairs made higher oﬀers in the trust game than if their partner was
from a diﬀerent race group, although this eﬀect was not signiﬁcant. However,
trustees in same race pairs made signiﬁcantly higher return oﬀers than those
paired with someone from a diﬀerent race group. Eckel and Wilson [2003] ﬁnd
that while proposers were signiﬁcantly less likely to make an oﬀer if they were
paired with members of minority race groups, 3 the trustworthiness4 of trustees
was unaﬀected by the race of the proposer.
Finally, while the available experimental evidence suggests that racial or eth-
3Speciﬁcally, African-American and Asian trustees were signiﬁcantly less likely to receive an
oﬀer.
4Trustworthiness was measured as the probability that the trustee returned the full amount
of the loan (before being doubled) made to them by the proposer.
3nic identities may aﬀect trust interactions, such behaviour is also likely to be
mediated by one’s membership of networks and peer groups, insofar as member-
ship of these networks aﬀects exposure to members of other groups, or creates
inter-group competition for resources. Available evidence from social psychology
conﬁrms the intuition that individuals who have close personal interactions with
outgroup members tend to exhibit greater empathy towards, and understanding
of, members of out groups more generally [Stephan and Finlay, 1999; Duncan et
al, 2003.] The alternative view, of course, is that exposure to other groups will
exacerbate tensions rather than alleviate them, especially in competitive settings.
[Sherif and Sherif, 1961; Lerner and Nagai, 1996; Thernstrom and Thernstrom,
1997]. In light of the educational reforms aimed at increasing racial integration
in schools that have occurred in post-apartheid South Africa, this paper will ex-
plore the associations between racial diversity in schools and peer groups and
inter-racial trust.
3 Experimental design
High school students from six diﬀerent high schools in the greater Cape Town
area were recruited to participate. These students form part of the ﬁrst generation
of South African students who have not only had the opportunity to participate
in a more integrated schooling environment, but have also spent much of their
lives living in the “new” South Africa, where attempts to redress the devastating
eﬀects of racial segregation under apartheid have been made.
Each participating school was visited three times. During the initial visit,
students were told about the experiments and given the opportunity to sign up.
At the second visit, which occurred at least two to three weeks prior to the
experiments being run in order to minimise possible priming of subjects, the
(randomly) selected students had their photographs taken and were asked to
complete a questionnaire designed to elicit demographic as well as attitudinal
information. During the third visit, the experiments were run. The 337 students
that participated in the experiments ranged in age from 14 to 19, with an almost
equal gender split. Just over two ﬁfths of the students were Black, with White
and Coloured5 students making up the remainder in roughly equal proportions.
The experiments were run on-site at the schools and each experimental session
involved three schools, as this was the minimum number of schools required to
ensure a suﬃcient degree of racial heterogeneity in the sample. The endowment
in the trust game was thirty rands 6 and all payments were made in cash at
5In South Africa, the term “Coloured” is used to refer to mixed-race individuals
6At the time of the experiments, the exchange rate was approximately US$1=ZAR10. Stu-
dents were also paid a show up fee.
4the end of the experimental session. The BDM [1995] version of the trust game
was run, where proposer oﬀers were tripled, and once proposers had made their
oﬀers, they were asked to record how much they expected their partner to return
to them. These expectations were recorded before the proposers received the
actual return oﬀers from their partners. Photographs were used to reveal the
racial identity of partners, and care was taken to ensure that students were not
assigned partners who attended their own school.
To maintain the anonymity of oﬀers, each student was given their own privacy
box, a three-sided cardboard box that stood up on each student’s desk, behind
which they recorded all their oﬀers. Once the experiment was over, students
were asked to complete additional questionnaires designed to elicit any doubts
that students might have had over the validity of the experiment.
A research team, comprising a team leader, room monitors and“phoners” was
dispatched to each school. Separate classrooms were used for proposers and
trustees and each classroom had a room monitor who ran the experiment. Given
the diverse locations of the participating schools, the oﬀers between participants
were communicated via cell phone by designated “phoners”. The “phoners” were
additional research assistants who were not in the classroom while the experiment
was run. They waitedoutside theclassroom until the proposers had recorded their
oﬀers and handed back their forms. Once this was complete, the room monitor
left the classroom, and the phoner took over, explaining that as they had not been
in the room during the experiment, they had no way of knowing which student
had made any particular oﬀer. The phoner then recorded the oﬀers onto a single
sheet of paper at a desk at the front of the classroom, before calling the location
where the trustees were waiting for the oﬀers. This protocol was followed in every
group, and phone monitors all used the same script when transmitting the oﬀers
in order to reinforce the credibility of the experiment in the eyes of the students.
Once the call had been initiated in the presence of the students, the phoner in
the proposer classroom would leave the classroom before transmitting the actual
oﬀers, but would leave the classroom door open so that students could verify that
he/she was still on the telephone. It was explained to the participating students
that this was being done in order to maintain the privacy of their oﬀers, so that
their colleagues in their classroom could not hear what oﬀers they had made.
While it is possible that this might have created some doubt in the minds of the
students as to the credibility of the experiment, post-experiment questionnaires,
where their doubts about the experiment were elicited do not indicate that this
was a problem.7
7The post-experiment questionnaires utilised the same questions as Frolich et al[2001]. In
regressions not reported here, none of the doubt variables signiﬁcantly aﬀected behaviour.
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On average, proposers oﬀered a third of their endowment (Table 1). This is
somewhat lower than in other trust games, where proposers send 50% of their
endowment on average [Camerer, 2002]. However, in trust game experiments run
with school children in the United States, Harbaugh et al [2002] ﬁnd that average
oﬀers are 33% across all participants, and 37% for school children in grades 9-12,
a sample most comparable to this study.
Black proposers make signiﬁcantly lower oﬀers than White or Coloured stu-
dents in the trust game (Tables 1 and 2).8 This supports the ﬁndings of Ashraf
et al [2003] who ﬁnd similar results in a trust game among South African Uni-
versity students. However, in contrast to Hoﬀ and Pandey’s [2003] result that
members of historically disadvantaged groups may not take advantage of eco-
nomic opportunities because they expect to be poorly rewarded for their eﬀorts,
Black proposers do not make lower oﬀers because they expect to receive signif-
icantly lower returns. In fact, Black proposers expected on average to receive a
larger proportion of the tripled endowment back than other students, and these
expectations do not vary signiﬁcantly with the race of the person they are paired
with (Table 1).9 Moreover, in the pooled regression results in Table 2, Black
proposers make signiﬁcantly lower oﬀers even after controlling for their expected
returns.
8In evaluating diﬀerences in means, an independent samples t-test was used in conjunction
with a Mann-Whitney test. Where the signiﬁcance levels from these two tests diﬀered, this will
be reported, but unless this is made explicit, the signiﬁcance levels from the two tests is the
same. Mean oﬀers made by Black proposers are signiﬁcantly lower than mean oﬀers by White
proposers (signiﬁcant at 1% level) and Coloured proposers (signiﬁcant at 5% level using t-test;
20% using Mann-Whitney). There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between oﬀers made by White
and Coloured proposers on average.
9Expectations of the mean proportion to be returned held by Black proposers are signiﬁ-
cantly higher than for White proposers (15% signiﬁcance using t-test) and Coloured proposers
(signiﬁcant at 5% level using t-test; 11% using Mann-Whitney). There are no signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in the expected mean returns held by White and Coloured proposers, and there are
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the expected mean return in Black-Black pairings compared to
Black-White and Black-Coloured pairings respectively.
64.2 Black Trustees Are Mistakenly Trusted Less
Black trustees receive signiﬁcantly lower oﬀers on average than White and
Coloured trustees. 10 While there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the oﬀers made
by White proposers contingent on the race of their partner, Coloured proposers
make signiﬁcantly lower oﬀers to Black trustees, favoring Coloured trustees in-
stead (Tables 1 and 2). Black proposers, surprisingly, make signiﬁcantly lower
oﬀers to Black trustees11.
These lower oﬀers to Black trustees are at least partially attributable to an
expectation that Black trustees would remit less than others on average (Table
1).12 In the Tobit regression results, (Table 2), notice the decline in the race co-
eﬃcient (Trustee is Black) once expectations are accounted for. In fact, White
proposers make signiﬁcantly higher oﬀers to Black trustees once expectations are
accounted for in the Tobit regression (Table 2). This may suggest the confounding
inﬂuence of altruism on trusting behaviour [Carter and Castillo, 2003; Cox, 2000;
Ashraf et al, 2003], since despite the fact that White proposers expect Black (and
Coloured) trustees to return signiﬁcantly less,13 they do not fully adjust their
oﬀers downwards in response. Recall that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in oﬀers made by White proposers contingent on the race of the trustee. By
way of contrast, while there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the expectations of
Coloured proposers concerning returns from trustees of diﬀerent race groups, they
still exhibit a strong insider-bias in their oﬀers and do not trust Black trustees
(Tables 1 and 2).
Ironically, any expectation that Black trustees would remit signiﬁcantly lower
amounts is mistaken. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the amounts remitted
by Black and White trustees on average, and Black trustees remit signiﬁcantly
higher amounts than Coloured trustees (Table 1). Indeed, it is Coloured trustees
10Oﬀers to Black trustees are signiﬁcantly lower than oﬀers to white trustees (10% using a
t-test; 1% using Mann Whitney) and Coloured trustees (5% signiﬁcance using t-test, and 1%
using Mann-Whitney). There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the oﬀers made to White
and Coloured trustees on average.
11In Table 1, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the oﬀers made by White proposers
contingent on the race of the trustee. Oﬀers in Coloured-Coloured pairings are signiﬁcantly
higher than Coloured-Black pairings (signiﬁcant at 1% level), and Coloured-White pairings
(signiﬁcance of 10% using t-test; 15% using Mann-Whitney). Oﬀers in Black-Black pairings
are signiﬁcantly lower (at 5% signiﬁcance level) than Black-White and Black-Coloured pairings
respectively.
12On average, Black trustees are expected to remit less than White trustees (signiﬁcance of
15% using t-test; 5% using Mann-Whitney). However, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the expected returns from Black versus Coloured trustees.
13White proposers expect both Black and Coloured trustees to remit signiﬁcantly less than
White trustees. Mean expectations in White-Black and White-Coloured pairings are signiﬁ-
cantly lower than for White-White pairings, at the 1% and 5% levels respectively (Table 1).
7who return signiﬁcantly less than both Black and White trustees, and14 this
is especially the case in Black-Coloured pairings.15 These mean diﬀerences are
reﬂected in the regression results presented in Table 3 which demonstrate that
return oﬀers by Black trustees to Black and White proposers are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent than returns by other trustees, and in fact, they make signiﬁcantly higher
return oﬀers to Coloured proposers than trustees from other race groups. Thus,
any expectation that Blackproposers would consistentlyreturn signiﬁcantlylower
amounts compared with other trustees is mistaken.
However, there is a caveat here. Because Black trustees make signiﬁcantly
higher return oﬀers to Coloured proposers compared to Black proposers, it may
be that Black proposers paired with Black trustees rationally expected to receive
lower return oﬀers, and hence made low oﬀers to Black partners in anticipation
of this. Thus, the lower oﬀers by Black proposers to Black trustees may partially
reﬂect this expectation, as is suggested by the diﬀerence (albeit insigniﬁcant)
in expected returns for Black-Black versus Black-Coloured pairings (Table 1).
However, even after accounting for expectations, Black proposers still exhibit a
negative bias towards Black trustees, so expectations alone cannot fully account
for this result (Table 2).
4.3 White Proposers Prefer Not To Trust Blacks At All
The results presented thus far suggest a systematic pattern of distrust towards
Black trustees, despite the fact that Black trustees are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
in their remittance behaviour. However, the Tobit results treat an oﬀer of zero as
part of a continuum of oﬀers, when arguably, a zero oﬀer indicates the proposer’s
unwillingness to engage in an interaction at all. If making a zero oﬀer is a
qualitatively diﬀerent response than making a positive oﬀer, in that it signals an
unwillingness or refusal to trust at all, as opposed to a decision to trust a little,
then examining behaviour in terms of the decision to make an oﬀer or not, as
separate from the decision of how large an oﬀer to make once the participation
hurdle has been crossed, may yield interesting results.
14Returns by Coloured trustees are signiﬁcantly lower than returns from Whites trustees (at
5% level of signiﬁcance), and Blacks trustees (1% signiﬁcance using t-test, 5% using Mann-
Whitney).
15In pairings involving Coloured proposers, Black trustees returned signiﬁcantly higher
amounts than White trustees (1% signiﬁcance using t-test; 5% using Mann-Whitney) or
Coloured trustees (1% signiﬁcance). There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the amounts re-
turned by White or Coloured trustees to Coloured proposers. In pairings involving Black pro-
posers, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the amounts return by Black and White trustees
to Black proposers. However, both return signiﬁcantly higher amounts than Coloured trustees.
8Cragg’s [1971] speciﬁcation provides a means of testing whether the probability
of a non-limit outcome is determined apart from the level of the non limit out-
come as a variant of the tobit model, using a likelihood ratio test. Utilising this
speciﬁcation, the likelihood ratio test conﬁrms that for the regressions presented
in Table 4, the probability of a limit outcome is determined apart from the level
of the non limit outcome.16 In addition, there are some interesting racial diﬀer-
ences. For Black and Coloured proposers, being paired with a Black partner has
no impact on the decision to make an oﬀer or not. Rather, it impacts (negatively
and signiﬁcantly) only the size of the oﬀer that is made. In stark contrast, White
proposers with Black partners are signiﬁcantly less likely to make an oﬀer at all,
preferring to “opt out” of any interaction at all, while White proposers who do
decide to engage in an interaction do not treat Black trustees signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ently than trustees from other race groups.
4.4 Black And Coloured Trustees Are Less Trustworthy Towards
Black Proposers
Average remittancesby trustees in this experimentare substantially lower than
in other studies, with less than a third of the tripled endowment being returned
on average (Table 1). Harbaugh et al [2003] ﬁnd similar results in their trust
games run with children, noting that children tend not to display the same high
levels of reciprocity as respondents in the Berg et al [1995] experiments.
Black proposers receive signiﬁcantly lower returns from Black and Coloured
trustees (Table 5).17 Moreover, Black and Coloured trustees are signiﬁcantly less
likely to make any return at all when they are paired with a Black proposer
as demonstrated by the probit regression results in Table 518. White trustees,
16Speciﬁcally, in the pooled results, the test yields a chi-square statistic of 114.81 (p=0.00).
In the separate race regressions, a chi-square statistic of 26.11 (p=0.00) for Black proposers;
chi-square statistic of 59.22 (p=0.00) for Coloured proposers; and chi-square statistic of 47.41
(p=0.00) for White proposers. These results hold when one includes the additional controls for
expectations (although the magnitude of the chi-square statistic is reduced in every case, the
signiﬁcance values are still well below the 5% level).
17Note that this is diﬀerent from the argument made earlier that Black trustees do not remit
signiﬁcantly lower amounts than other trustees. There, the argument focused on returns by
Black trustees to proposers of diﬀerent races. The argument here focuses on returns by trustees
of diﬀerent races to Black proposers, hence the divergence in results. Moreover, the result
that Black trustees make signiﬁcantly lower return oﬀers to Black proposers is due to the fact
that Black trustees remitted signiﬁcantly higher amounts to Coloured proposers speciﬁcally, as
discussed in Result B above.
18Utilising Cragg’s speciﬁcation once again, the likelihood ratio test conﬁrms that with the
exception of Coloured trustees, the probability of a limit outcome is determined apart from the
level of the non limit outcome. Speciﬁcally, in the pooled results, the test yields a chi-square
9however, do not treat Black proposers signiﬁcantly diﬀerently than proposers
from other race groups (Table 5).
5 Racial Diversity and Trust
Trusting behaviour, may, of course, be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by an individual’s
exposure to and interaction with members of other race groups. Individuals
who attend racially mixed high schools, or who count members of other race
groups among their closest friends, may plausibly behave quite diﬀerently towards
members of other race groups in strategic settings compared with individuals
who do not have the same exposure. Duncan et al (2003), for example, ﬁnd that
college students tend to be more empathetic towards the social groups to which
their roommates belong, and in particular, white students randomly assigned
black roommates in their ﬁrst year of college tend to be more likely to have
friends from minority race groups in their later years, and be more supportive of
aﬃrmative action policies.
To examine the association between racial diversity in schools and trust be-
haviour towards black participants, the measure of racial heterogeneity used here
is the Herﬁndahl concentration formula,19 which is frequently used by economists
studying the impact of ethnic heterogeneity on economic growth [Easterly and
Levine, 1997; Collier, 1998; 1999; Fedderke and Klitgaard, 1998]. The racial
diversity of friendship groups is represented by a dummy variable that takes a
value of one if the respondent and her three closest friends are all from the same
race group. Based on these measures of racial diversity in schools and friend-
ship groups, black students in this experiment are both more likely to have same
race friends and to attend less racially diverse schools.20 Because each student
statistic of 17.31 (p=0.01); a chi-square statistic of 15.17 (p=0.02) for Black trustees; chi-square
statistic of 8.68 (p=0.19) for Coloured trustees; and chi-square statistic of 24.41 (p=0.00) for
White trustees.











where ni is the number of members of the ith race group in the school, and N is the total
number of students in the school. This measure reﬂects the likelihood that two students chosen
at random in a school will be from diﬀerent race groups.
20The average measure of racial diversity in schools based on the Herﬁndahl index is 0.13 for
Black students, 0.54 for White students and 0.52 for Coloured students. Similarly, 84% of black
students had same race friends, compared with 69% of White students, and 57% of Coloured
students.
10in a particular school will have the same measure of school racial diversity, the
regressions control for clustering at the school level.
Before proceeding, there is an important caveat to all the results presented
below. Owing to unresolved identiﬁcation issues, the relationships between racial
diversity in schools and friendship groups, and oﬀers made to black partners can
only be characterised as statistical associations. However, there may be good
reasons to make the causal argument that increased racial diversity in schools or
peer groups in post-apartheid South Africa has bred racial tolerance, particularly
towards black partners. Educational reform in the late 1990s that removed in-
stitutionalised racial segregation in schools meant that non-white students could
attend formerly all-white schools. 21 Given the historically vast diﬀerences in
educational spending, facilities and teacher quality between white and black ed-
ucational institutions, it is far more plausible that the driving force behind non-
white individuals enrolling at formerly all-white schools had to do with accessing
better quality education, as opposed to preferences concerning racial diversity.
Moreover, white students were already in these schools, so in some sense, the
increased racial integration in their schools was exogenously imposed on them, as
opposed to being initiated by them or their parents. And ﬁnally, it seems unlikely
that the signiﬁcant institutional changes that occurred post-1994 would not have
had a signiﬁcant impact on the attitudes and behaviours of this generation of
high school students. Prior to this, the opportunities for inter-racial mixing were
very limited, being the exception rather than the rule.
5.1 Racial Diversity In Schools And Peer Groups Is Positively
Associated With Trust Towards Blacks
Table 6 presents the Tobit regression results including controls for racial diver-
sity in schools and peer groups. The interaction terms between racial diversity
in schools and friendship groups are included in order to control for the possibil-
ity that despite attendance at racially mixed schools, students may still cluster
with friends from the same race group. The top panel of Table 8 presents the
partial derivatives of these proposer oﬀers, evaluated at the mean, speciﬁcally
for proposers with black partners. I refer to these partial derivatives in what
follows.22
21Contrary to expectation, it is not the case that more racially diverse schools in this sample
are bordered by Black and Coloured neighborhoods. Students travel long distances to school,
often attending formerly all-White schools in white suburbs far from Black and Coloured town-
ships.
22In evaluating the partial derivatives, only co-eﬃcients that were signiﬁcant at least at the
10% level of signiﬁcance were included, otherwise their value was recorded as zero.
11Even after controlling for racial diversity measures, Black proposers still make
signiﬁcantly lower oﬀers to Black trustees relative to trustees from other race
groups. The extent of this distrust is, however, reduced for Black proposers with
same race friends (Table 8, Row 1). In contrast, White and Coloured proposers
with same race friends are signiﬁcantly less trusting of Black trustees, while there
is an associated reduction (and in the case of White proposers, a reversal) of this
distrust towards Black trustees for those with mixed race friends.
However, the behaviour of proposers towards Black trustees may be diﬀerent
depending on the extent of racial diversity in the proposer’s school environment.
Oﬀers by proposers with Black partners are increasing in the extent of racial
diversity in their schools (Table 8, Row 2), suggesting that exposure to a racially
diverse environment is signiﬁcantly and positively associated with trusting be-
haviour towards black partners. This association is even larger if the proposer,
most notably Black and White proposers, has mixed race friends.
The composition of friendship groups matters too. White and Coloured pro-
posers with same race friends are signiﬁcantly less trusting of Black trustees than
those with mixed race friends, while the reverse holds true for Black proposers
(Table 8, Row 3). However, a key ﬁnding is that racial diversity in schools and
friendship groups interact in important ways. White and Black proposers in
more racially diverse schools with same race friends are signiﬁcantly less trusting
of Black partners (Table 8, Row 4). For Coloured proposers, the eﬀect is in the
opposite direction, a somewhat puzzling result that warrants further investigation
in future work.
5.2 Racial Diversity In Schools And Peer Groups Is Positively
Associated With Trustworthiness Towards Blacks
Once the additional controls for racial diversity in schools and friendship
groups are included in the trustee regression (Table 7), the returns by Black and
Coloured trustees to Black proposers are no longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than
their returns to non-black proposers, suggesting that racial diversity in schools
and peer groups is positively associated with greater trustworthiness towards
blacks. (See Table 8, Row 5, for the partial derivative estimates evaluated at the
mean).23 White trustees with same race friends make signiﬁcantly higher returns
23A qualiﬁcation on the results pertaining to black responders is that because of collinearity
between variables, it is not possible to include the entire set of variables in this regression.
Thus, it is not possible to distinguish the associations between racial diversity in both friends
and schools on the behaviour of Black trustees from the associations of these measures for Black
trustees speciﬁcally paired with a Black proposer. See Table 8.
12to their black proposers while those with mixed race friends make signiﬁcantly
lower return oﬀers, a somewhat counterintuitive result. 24
Moreover, once again, racial diversity in schools and friendship groups interact
in important ways. White trustees in more racially mixed high schools with same
race friends are signiﬁcantly less trustworthy towards black proposers than white
responders in more racially diverse schools with mixed race friends. This mirrors
the association between racial diversity in schools and friends and trusting be-
haviour by White proposers.
6 Discussion
The results presented here suggest that, at least for this sample of South
African students, racial identity remains a salient cue for decision making in a
strategic setting characterised by limited information. The signiﬁcantly lower
trust exhibited towards Black trustees is at least partially attributable to an
expectation by proposers that Black trustees would remit less. Arguably, such
expectations may be quite rational, given the persistent socio-economic diﬀer-
ences between race groups, with Black South Africans being signiﬁcantly poorer
than others on average. Yet, Black trustees did not conform to this expectation
in these games, and their behaviour sends a clear signal that in spite of their
poorer socio-economic backgrounds on average, they are at least as trustworthy
as members of other race groups.
But perhaps more important is the result that mistrust of Black partners man-
ifests itself in diﬀerent ways, with White proposers being signiﬁcantly less likely
to engage in an exchange at all, while Black and Coloured partners engage but
at signiﬁcantly lower levels than when paired with non-Black partners. These
diﬀerences in behaviour are important. By refusing to engage in any exchange at
all, White proposers are unable to gain additional information about the trust-
worthiness of Black partners, and thus, racial stereotypes remain entrenched.
This behaviour of White proposers paired with Black partners is consistent with
Loury’s [2002] notion of racial stigma, the argument being that when subjects
are racially stigmatised, observers are less likely to engage in the critical exper-
imentation required to reveal ﬂaws in their beliefs concerning these individuals.
In contrast, Black and Coloured proposers appear more willing to undertake this
experimentation process, making low oﬀers to Black trustees, even though they
24However, if one accepts that the second stage in the trust game is analogous to a dictator
game, this is the same pattern of behaviour as revealed by white proposers with same race
friends who were paired with a black partner in a dictator game. The dictator game results are
not reported here. See Burns, 2004.
13may expect that these oﬀers might not pay oﬀ. In so doing, these proposers are
able to acquire important information that allows them to update their expec-
tations and stereotypes concerning the trustworthiness of Black partners. An
important and interesting extension of this work would be to observe inter-racial
trust in a repeated trust game setting, that would allow one to observe the extent
of the updating process for proposers from diﬀerent race groups paired with Black
partners.
The systematic pattern of distrust towards Black partners might be charac-
terised as “discrimination in contract” [Loury, 2002:95]25 and while such discrim-
ination may be morally objectionable, recourse to third parties such as the State
to prevent such discrimination from occurring in real world contexts is certainly
possible. However, these results also shed light on the more invidious problem of
“discrimination in contact” [Loury, 2000:95], or “race-mediated social relations”
[Loury, 2002:100]. Inter-racial trust, particularly towards Blacks, is positively as-
sociated with increasing racial diversity in both the school environment and peer
groups, both of which reduce “discrimination in contact”. The racial composi-
tion of local networks such as peer groups may be especially important, in that
individuals may continue to practice discrimination in contact in terms of their
close associates, despite attending racially diverse schools. In these experiments,
this type of behaviour is associated with lower trust towards Blacks. However,
to the extent that attendance at a more racially mixed high school increases the
incidence of mixed race friendships, as documented by Quillian and Campbell
[2003], these two factors should work together over time to enhance inter-racial
trust.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has presented the results of a trust game played by a sample of
high school students in South Africa, where the racial identity of both partners
was revealed using photographs. Before accouting for racial diversity measures,
Black and Coloured participants are both less trusting of and less trustworthy
towards Blacks, while White students choose either not to engage in exchange
at all, or apparently allow altruistic concerns to dominate strategic concerns in
their behaviour. However, the results provide encouraging evidence of positive
associations between greater racial diversity in schools and peer groups and inter-
racial trust, particularly towards Blacks.
25Loury[2002:95]deﬁnes this as the “unequal treatment of otherwise like persons on the basis
of race in the execution of formal transactions”. In contrast, discrimination in contact is the
“unequal treatment of persons on the basis of race in the associations and relationships that
are formed among individuals in social life.”
14Given the diﬃculties of conducting this type of experimental work on a large
scale, small sample sizes are inevitable, and there is an important need for fur-
ther replication of this work, perhaps even using a repeated game setting in order
to examine more carefully the notion of racial stigma as distinct from racial
stereotypes. Moreover, if economists are serious about better understanding the
mechanisms through which social capital, networks and group aﬃliation aﬀect
behaviour, and thereby exchange, then more detailed attention needs to be given
to collecting better and more comprehensive data on the composition and func-
tioning of these kinds of institutions. The simple measures of racial diversity
in schools and peer groups used in this study, while compelling, are limited in
illuminating the ways in which they really aﬀect behaviour. This is a challenging
but exciting task for future behavioural research.
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By race of proposer
Proposer is Black 0.24 (0.19) 0.43 (0.26) 0.21 (0.23)
69.00 60.00 59.00
Proposer is White 0.43 (0.31) 0.37 (0.13) 0.24 (0.23)
49.00 40.00 37.00
Proposer is Colored 0.34 (0.26) 0.34 (0.20) 0.20 (0.16)
51.00 44.00 43.00
Total 0.33 (0.26) 0.39 (0.22) 0.23 (0.21)
169.00 144.00 139.00
By race of trustee
Trustee is Black 0.27 (0.28) 0.35 (0.22) 0.28 (0.25)
70.00 53.00 52.00
Trustee is White 0.36 (0.24) 0.40 (0.16) 0.25 (0.19)
55.00 49.00 47.00
Trustee is Colored 0.38 (0.24) 0.41 (0.27) 0.16 (0.16)
44.00 42.00 40.00
Total 0.33 (0.26) 0.39 (0.22) 0.23 (0.21)
169.00 144.00 139.00
By race pairing
Black to Black 0.16 (0.14) 0.39 (0.29) 0.26 (0.30)
23.00 18.00 18.00
Black to White 0.28 (0.20) 0.41 (0.20) 0.25 (0.18)
23.00 21.00 20.00
Black to Colored 0.30 (0.22) 0.48 (0.30) 0.13 (0.18)
23.00 21.00 21.00
White to Black 0.41 (0.36) 0.31 (0.13) 0.22 (0.26)
25.00 18.00 17.00
White to White 0.47 (0.26) 0.44 (0.09) 0.28 (0.20)
21.00 19.00 18.00
White to Colored 0.33 (0.17) 0.30 (0.06) 0.11 (0.09)
3.00 3.00 2.00
Colored to Black 0.23 (0.23) 0.34 (0.20) 0.35 (0.14)
22.00 17.00 17.00
Colored to White 0.32 (0.22) 0.31 (0.15) 0.18 (0.15)
11.00 9.00 9.00
Colored to Colored 0.49 (0.25) 0.35 (0.23) 0.20 (0.13)
18.00 18.00 17.00
In all pairings above, the race of the proposer is presented ﬁrst, and the race of the trustee presented second.
Standard deviations in brackets, and sample size in italics
20Table 2: Tobit Regression Conditioning Oﬀers In Trust Game On Race
Variable Pooled Proposer is Black Proposer is Colored Proposer is White
Tobit index estimates
Constant -2.381 -1.639 19.793 12.219 -32.690 -18.860 -104.656 -59.213
(0.23) (0.18) (1.52) (1.01) (0.92) (0.64) (2.19) (1.98)
Proposer is Black -0.485 -0.597
(2.53) (3.60)
Trustee is Black -0.726 -0.432 -0.564 -0.413 -1.063 -0.810 -0.541 0.547
(3.94) (2.67) (2.21) (1.73) (3.09) (2.81) (1.41) (2.03)
Age of proposer 0.482 0.326 -2.235 -1.385 4.336 2.558 13.553 7.698
(0.37) (0.29) (1.41) (0.94) (0.94) (0.67) (2.22) (2.01)
Age squared of proposer -0.011 -0.008 0.070 0.044 -0.133 -0.080 -0.428 -0.250
(0.28) (0.24) (1.46) (0.99) (0.89) (0.65) (2.20) (2.05)
Proposer is female -0.067 0.074 -0.330 -0.194 -0.080 0.150 0.092 0.155
(0.48) (1.36) (0.86) (0.26) (0.58) (0.23) (0.60)
Proposer’s expected return 2.551 1.500 2.766 6.226
(7.72) (3.68) (4.72) (7.77)
Log Likelihood -251.96 -225.07 -97.12 -90.71 -72.16 -62.49 -74.59 -52.27
n 169.00 169.00 70.00 70.00 51.00 51.00 48.00 48.00
R
2
ANNOVA 0.12 0.40 0.14 0.31 0.21 0.51 0.13 0.67
Marginal Effects
Constant -2.280 -1.603 19.029 11.885 -31.919 -18.708 -99.337 -58.998
Proposer is Black -0.465 -0.584
Trustee is Black -0.696 -0.423 -0.542 -0.401 -1.038 -0.803 -0.513 0.545
Age of Proposer 0.462 0.319 -2.149 -1.347 4.233 2.538 12.864 7.670
Age squared of Proposer -0.011 -0.008 0.067 0.043 -0.129 -0.079 -0.406 -0.249
Proposer is female -0.064 0.072 -0.318 -0.189 -0.078 0.148 0.088 0.154
Proposer’s expected return 2.495 1.459 2.743 6.203
Absolute value of t-statistics reported in brackets. The dependent variable, Amount oﬀered in the Trust Game,
is logged to minimise scaling eﬀects.
21Table 3: Tobit Regression, Conditioning Return Oﬀers In Trust Game By
Trustees On Own Demographic Characteristics And Oﬀer Received From Pro-
poser







Constant 1.543 6.077 -4.367 1.261
(0.45) (1.07) (1.14) (0.12)
Trustee is Black 0.029 -0.023 0.109 0.015
(0.63) (0.28) (1.80) (0.12)
Age of trustee -0.184 -0.800 0.575 -0.103
(0.44) (1.13) (1.23) (0.08)
Age squared of trustee 0.006 0.027 -0.018 0.003
(0.49) (1.21) (1.23) (0.06)
Trustee is female 0.005 -0.009 -0.006 0.024
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.26)
Tripled amount received by trustee -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(1.22) (0.46) (2.55) (1.22)
Log Likelihood -30.940 -21.463 17.461 -9.952
n 139.000 59.000 41.000 39.000
R
2
ANNOVA 0.020 0.040 0.330 0.020
R
2
DECOMP 0.030 0.090 0.340 0.030
Marginal Effects
Constant 1.228 4.237 -4.244 0.998
Trustee is black 0.023 -0.016 0.106 0.012
Age of trustee -0.147 -0.558 0.559 -0.082
Age squared of trustee 0.005 0.019 -0.017 0.002
Trustee is female 0.004 -0.006 -0.006 0.019
Tripled amount received by trustee -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
The dependent variable is the fraction remitted by the trustee (Amount returned/Tripled amount received),






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 6: Tobit Regression Controlling For The Inﬂuence Of Racial Diversity In
Schools And Friendship Groups On Oﬀers In The Trust Game.







Constant 0.470 20.918 -17.996 -77.228
(0.04) (2.31) (1.41) (2.04)
Proposer is Black -0.211
(1.53)
Trustee is Black -1.287 -9.979 1.909 -4.636
(0.63) (27.79) (0.68) (2.36)
Proposer is female 0.101 -0.279 0.383 0.136
(0.8) (3.33) (0.72) (1.91)
Proposer’s expected return 2.670 1.526 2.827 6.343
(5.94) (11.43) (2.13) (6.98)
Racial diversity in proposer’s school 3.261 3.098 4.084 3.415
(12.11) (9.25) (3.65) (1.83)
Racial diversity in proposer’s school x
Trustee is Black 2.022 17.198 -4.061 10.927
(0.64 (28.81) (0.80) (2.98)
Racial diversity in proposer's friends 1.192 1.426 3.822 2.807
(5.63) (10.75) (2.06) (7.64)
Racial diversity of proposer's friends x
Trustee is Black 0.629 9.262 -6.381 2.489
(0.31) (22.48) (11.87) (1.45)
Racial diversity in proposer's school and
friends -2.210 -2.644 -7.268 -4.534
(5.69) (7.55) (1.92) (6.75)
Racial diversity in proposer's school and
friends x Trustee is Black -1.842 -14.862 10.926 -6.064
(0.58) (25.47) (12.78) (1.68)
Log Likelihood -217.12 -80.67 -59.23 -47.34
n 169.00 70.00 51.00 48.00
R
2
ANNOVA 0.46 0.47 0.58 0.72
Marginal Effects
Constant 0.462 20.662 -17.897 -77.142
Proposer is Black -0.207
Trustee is Black -1.264 -9.857 1.899 -4.631
Proposer is female 0.100 -0.276 0.380 0.136
Proposer's expected return 2.623 1.507 2.811 6.336
Racial diversity in proposer's school 3.204 3.060 4.061 3.411
Racial diversity in proposer's school x
Trustee is Black 1.987 16.987 -4.039 10.915
Racial diversity in proposer's friends 1.172 1.408 3.801 2.804
Racial diversity of proposer's friends x
Trustee is Black 0.618 9.148 -6.346 2.486
Racial diversity in proposer's school and
friends -2.171 -2.612 -7.228 -4.529
Racial diversity in proposer's school and
friends x Trustee is Black -1.810 -14.680 10.866 -6.058
Age controls included but not reported. The dependent variable, Amount oﬀered in the Trust Game, is logged.
Absolute value of t-statistics is reported in brackets. The results control for clustering by school.
25Table 7: Return Oﬀers By Trustees In The Trust Game, Controlling For The








Constant 1.73 2.74 -0.08 6.29
(0.42) (0.30) (0.01) (0.87)
Proposer is Black -0.52 -0.28 0.14 -2.00
(2.79) (0.19) (0.18) (1.73)
Trustee is female 0.01 -0.13 0.12 0.07
(0.17) (2.90) (3.53) (1.57)
Amount received by Trustee 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.98) (3.73) (0.12) (0.41)
Racial diversity in Trustee's school 0.33 -0.26 0.95 3.80
(0.91) (2.77) (0.59) (3.54)
Racial diversity in Trustee's school x proposer
is Black 0.61 -0.06 -0.70 3.46
(1.92) (0.02) (0.43) (1.71)
Racial diversity in Trustee's friends 0.18 -0.11 0.71 2.08
(0.99) (0.85) (0.95) (2.26)
Racial diversity in Trustee's friends x proposer
is Black 0.50 0.18 -0.77 3.09
(2.71) (0.12) (0.99) (2.05)
Racial diversity in school and friends of Trustee -0.39 -1.49 -3.91
(1.03) (1.06) (2.19)
Racial diversity in school and friends of Trustee x
proposer is Black -0.76 -0.08 1.70 -5.39
(2.65) (0.03) (1.04) (1.98)
LogL -24.56 -2.62 8.38 -4.93
n 139.00 52.00 39.00 48.00
R2 decomp 0.08 0.26 0.24 0.30
Marginal Effects
Constant 1.39 2.35 -0.07 5.33
Proposer is Black -0.42 -0.24 0.12 -1.70
Trustee is female 0.01 -0.11 0.10 0.06
Amount received by Trustee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Racial diversity in Trustee's school 0.27 -0.23 0.81 3.22
Racial diversity in Trustee's school x proposer
is Black 0.49 -0.05 -0.59 2.93
Racial diversity in Trustee's friends 0.14 -0.09 0.60 1.76
Racial diversity in Trustee's friends x proposer
is Black 0.40 0.15 -0.65 2.62
Racial diversity in school and friends of Trustee -0.32 -1.26 -3.31
Racial diversity in school and friends of Trustee x
proposer is Black -0.61 -0.07 1.44 -4.57
Age controls included but not reported. Absolute value of t-ratios in brackets. Results control for clustering at
school level.
26Table 8: Partial Derivative Estimates [Evaluated At The Mean] Of Oﬀers In The
Trust Game, Controlling For Racial Diversity In Schools And Friendship Groups.
Key: BlackProposer = Proposer is Black; BlackTrustee= Trustee is Black, RDSchool = Racial diversity in
schools; RDFriends = Racial diversity in friendship groups. These eﬀects are signiﬁcant at least at the 10%
level of signiﬁcance.
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